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Reconstructing Tradition. The Debate on “Invented 
Tradition” in the Japanese Modernization 
Abstract 
Several scholarly works on Japan explain the specific phenomena of the 19th century 
Japanese modernization in terms of Japanese tradition and culture. Against this, another 
trend (based on mainly postmodern theory) denies the validity of these explanations, citing 
the theory of “invented tradition”. This paper tries to add some thoughts to this debate, 
examining the concept of tradition in Japanese modernization. The second part of the 
article tries to demonstrate the utilization (“reconstruction” – by Eisenstadt) of tradition 
with a specific moment of the Japanese modernization: the founding of the modern state in 
1868.  
Key words: Japanese modernization, invented tradition, ideological foundations of the 
Meiji Restoration, Edo-period kokugaku. 
 
The question of tradition 
In the Meiji period (1868–1912) a nation state with modern 
institutions was created during a course of modernization of the country 
technically, industrially, politically, socially and institutionally. It 
followed the European developmental pattern, but was built on the basis 
of Japanese cultural traditions had been made in the Edo period.
1
 During 
the Edo/Tokugawa period (1600–1868) Japan remained relatively 
isolated from the world, so Japanese culture developed internally with 
very little outside influence. The central question of research for a long 
time was that what made Japan capable of becoming a modern 
industrialized country and a modern state, and if – and to what extent – 
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1 See: Robert Bellah, Tokugawa Religion. The Cultural Roots of Modern Japan, New York 
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such modernization was made possible by the different aspects of 
Japanese “traditional” culture or “premodern” (pre-Meiji) society. The 
Edo/Tokugawa period is called “early modern” now, and regarded as the 
antecedents of modern Japan. The pluralistic socio-political structure, 
the growing marketiation of the economy, the development of 
protoindustrial enterprises, the strong cohesion of family units and their 
openness to penetration by the wider society, and the like constitute 
important factors in the successful modernization of Japan.
2
 Actually, 
the foundation for future economic, social and political development 
was laid in this period. The establishment of a national market with 
money economy, increasing urbanization, an improved communications 
system, the impoverishment of the samurai class and the enrichment of 
the merchants, the rise of a new artistic and literary culture appropriate 
to town dwellers, increasing fervour of religious nationalism focusing on 
the person of the emperor – these are some of the enormous social and 
cultural changes going on in the period, many of them directly leading to 
the Restoration of 1868 and the new Japan that rose thereafter.
3
 
Intellectual development also paved the way for the formation of new 
ideological and political concepts. 
Against a tendency in many scholarly works on Japan to explain 
specific phenomena in terms of Japanese tradition and culture, 
“institutionalists” of various persuasions have totally denied the validity 
of such explanations.
4
 This latter tendency (on basically postmodern 
theoretical grounds) in the secondary literature of the past decades on 
modern Japanese development produced works that took many features 
of modern Japanese culture having been regarded “traditionally 
Japanese” to be “invented traditions” of an era of building a modern 
nation and national consciousness as a part of modernization in the 19
th
 
century.
5
 This approach denies the role of the Japanese cultural 
                                                          
2  Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, Japanese Civilization: A Comparative Review, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1996, p. 427. 
3 Bellah, Tokugawa Religion…, pp. 11–12. 
4 Eisenstadt, Japanese Civilization…, p. 311. 
5 Mainly exposed by Stephen Vlastos in his essay and other essays in the book he edited: 
Stephen Vlastos, ‘Tradition. Past/Present Culture and Modern Japanese History’ in Mirror 
of Modernity: Invented Traditions of Modern Japan, Stephen Vlastos (ed.), Berkeley and 
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998, pp. 1–18. Other (less intense, thus more 
conforming) examples: W. Dean Kinzley, Industrial Harmony in Modern Japan: The 
Invention of a Tradition, London: Routledge, 1991; Ichikawa Midori, Invented Tradition 
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traditions in the modernization process and in the life of contemporary 
Japan. They do not accept the view developed in the last decades among 
historians and social scientists of Japanese studies that cultural heritage, 
traditional values and practises predated Japan’s modernization and 
contributed to its success.
6
 This modernist approach tends to deny the 
role of the Japanese traditions in the success of modernization,
7
 rejecting 
the views of Japan specialists who ascribed Japan’s successful 
modernization to the utility of its premodern values and institutions, and 
refusing the assumption that “traditions” were direct cultural legacies. 
They emphasize the process of the “invention of tradition”. The 
secondary literature is now rich in volumes and essays on the Japanese 
invention of tradition, and, fortunately, also in reviews and criticism on 
these works.
8
 
According to the modernist interpretation, nations are “imagined 
communities” which became possible on a mass scale only relatively 
recently when individuals living in a region came to be able to construct 
a collective and unified image of themselves through the printed word 
(the age of capitalism).
9
 These “imagined communities” are established 
through common stories, myths, and the shared experience of life. 
However, all these factors imply that without some sense of a common 
culture, shared values, and similar traits the modern nation-state could 
not exist.
10
 This “national character” is sometimes referred to as “myth”, 
                                                                                                                     
in Shinto: A New Construction of the Emperor as a God of the State, Bloomington: 
Indiana University, 2000. 
6 Bellah, Tokugawa Religion…, pp. 11–12; Robert Bellah, Imagining Japan: The Japanese 
Tradition and Its Modern Interpretation, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 2003, pp. 1–62. See also: Michio Morishima, Why Has Japan 
Succeeded? Western Technology and the Japanese Ethos, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994, pp. 4–15;  Shichihei Yamamoto, The Spirit of Japanese Capitalism 
and Selected Essays, Lanham: Madison Books, 1992, pp. 1–22. 
7 Vlastos, ‘Tradition…’, p. 1. 
8 Reviews on Mirror of Modernity: Kerry Smith, Social History, Vol. 25, No. 1, January 
2000, pp. 119–121; David R. Ambaras, H-Japan (September, 1999), H-Net Reviews: 
https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=3406 (accessed 26.05.2016); Ann Waswo, 
Monumenta Nipponica, Vol. 54, No. 1, pp. 133–135; F. G. Notehelfer, Journal of 
Japanese Studies, Vol. 25, No. 2, 1999, pp. 432–438. 
9 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism, London: Verso, 1991, pp. 6–7, 224; Eric Hobsbawm, ‘Inventing Traditions’ 
in The Invention of Tradition, Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.), Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 1–14. 
10  Chris Burgess, ‘The “Illusion” of Homogeneous Japan and National Character: 
Discourse as a Toolto Transcend the “Myth” vs. “Reality” Binary’, The Asia-Pacific 
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according to the view that a nation is socially constructed and ultimately 
imagined by the people who perceive themselves to be part of that 
group. Hobsbawm describes this process of social construction as the 
“invention of tradition”, which is very important in the emergence of the 
modern nation-state.
11
 He and other modernists argue that many cultural 
practices, customs, and values which were thought to be old are actually 
of quite recent origin. 
It is importantto note, however, that “invented traditions” are never 
completely invented; rather, they almost always need to resonate with 
the inherited experiences and memories of ordinary people if they are to 
be accepted and internalised.
12
 The modernist interpretation of 
“invention of tradition” can be misleading, as this process does not mean 
introducing false or completely unknown things. Almost all the critics 
and even most of the authors of essays emphasizing the “inventedness” 
acknowledge that invented traditions are not merely inventions. As 
“traditions do not of course spring up ex nihilo; genealogies, if not 
origins, can be found”,13 the question of the origins and history of these 
“invented traditions” cannot be neglected. This is especially relevant to 
the case of Japan, because its modernization was linked to not only the 
global issues but also to the Japanese historical context. Examining the 
issue of “invention of tradition” without the determining ecological, 
historical and cultural factors can result serious misinterpretations. In 
case of Japan, its non-European context of the modernizing experience 
is relevant to understanding its framing of the past. It was crucial to “the 
Japanese defining/maintaining a sense of identity during the acutely 
Eurocentric late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries”.14 
The modern nation-sates naturally rely on the construction of a 
coherent set of common traits that make them possible to function as 
“imagined communities”, 15  so the invention of traditions can be 
regarded as the normal consequences of modernization and nation-
                                                                                                                     
Journal, Vol. 8, Issue 9, No. 1, 2010: http://japanfocus.org/-chris-burgess/3310 (accessed 
26.05.2016.) 
11 Hobsbawm, ‘Inventing Traditions…’, pp. 1–14. 
12 Notehelfer, Journal of  Japanese Studies, p. 436. 
13 Dipesh Chakrabarty, ‘Afterword. Revisiting the Tradition/Modernity Binary’ in Vlastos, 
Mirror of Modernity…, p. 288. 
14 Waswo, Monumenta..., pp. 133–135. 
15 Burgess, ‘The “Illusion” of Homogeneous Japan…’. 
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building.
16
 The importance of the relationship between the “invented 
tradition” and the collective experiences and memories (or even 
unconscious) of the community is often emphasized in different works.
17
 
The use of history in order to construct and legitimate a sense of a 
commonly shared culture is a similar pattern observed in different 
countries, as the historic past provides a wide selection of “value 
orientations and symbolic representations which can be selected, 
interpreted and used for the revival, revision and invention of 
modernized traditions”.18 Even Vlastos writes in his introductory essay: 
“I am not suggesting that the historical past played no role in the 
formation of modern Japanese identity. (…) The point, rather, is that 
cultural traditions are ‘chosen’, not inherited”.19 Stating that traditions 
are “chosen” implies that their origin can be found in the cultural 
heritage, which can mean that cultural heritage (tradition?) does have a 
decisive role in forming national identity and in modernization. The 
term “invented traditions” means rather selecting, choosing, reinforcing, 
stressing, emphasizing or institutionalizing some of the existing or old 
traditions, than really inventing new ones. 
The important role of the premodern cultural traditions in the modern 
era can be demonstrated with the case of the greatest cultural and social 
– and (re)invented in modernity – tradition of East Asia: Confucianism 
and its role in modernity, which is unavoidable concerning any issues of 
Japanese and East Asian modernization and “invented tradition” 
topics.
20
 A lot of scholars argued that Japanese Confucianism was the 
functional equivalent of the Protestant ethic in the formation of Japanese 
capitalism.
21
 The formation and existence of another (that is, different 
from Western) type of “non-individualistic version of capitalist 
modernity” with the characteristics of a network capitalism, supported 
by family virtues and group solidarity based on the Confucian values of 
collective solidarity and discipline has been stressed in East Asia. 
The “specific Asian cultural patterns” are said to influence and 
                                                          
16 Klaus-Georg Riegel, ‘Inventing Asian traditions’, Development and Society, Vol. 29, 
No. 1, June 2000, pp. 75–96. 
17 Notehelfer, Journal of Japanese Studies, p. 433. 
18 Riegel, ‘Inventing Asian traditions…’, p. 80. 
19 Vlastos, ‘Tradition…’, p. 12. 
20 Riegel, ‘Inventing Asian traditions…’, p. 75. 
21 Bellah, Tokugawa Religion…; Bellah, Imagining Japan…; Michio Morishima, Why Has 
Japan Succeeded?...; Shichihei Yamamoto, The Spirit of Japanese Capitalism. 
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decisively direct the processes of modernization in East Asia.
22
 This 
clearly shows the importance of the cultural dimensions of the 
modernization process, for which the Japanese development can be seen 
to provide an instructive example. With the invention of the slogan 
“wakonyōsai”, Japan could modernize its technological civilization 
while “accomplished successfully a presumed continuity of its cultural 
tradition”. This question is important especially for non-Western 
countries, as these cultures and societies face the “dilemma of changing 
their cultural directives and horizons without losing their identities”.23 
We can agree on that “invented traditions” are never completely 
invented, but contain elements of the common experiences of the 
community, parts of old cultural heritage, in some cases forgotten – but 
once may have been existing – tales and literary forms and language 
parts. The national identity is constructed in more or less the same way 
in different societies or nation-states; however, the material which was 
used to construct a sense of national identity is different, of course. The 
Japanese discourse on national identity is not unique but the historical 
materials it draws on and the national culture it helps to (re)create are 
unique.
24
 Creating a nation state with strong nationalism in Japan 
followed the European developmental pattern, but the basement 
(Japanese cultural traditions) on which it was built had been made in the 
Edo period: a cultural movement called kokugaku
25
 can be seen as a key 
factor of the reconstruction of tradition in the 19
th
 century. 
 
Kokugaku: early modern “reconstruction of tradition” 
                                                          
22 Riegel, ‘Inventing Asian traditions…’, p. 76. 
23 Ibid., p. 77. 
24 Burgess, ‘The Illusion…’. 
25  New works on kokugaku: See: Harry D. Harootunian, Things Seen and Unseen: 
Discourse and Ideology in Tokugawa Nativism, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1988; Peter Nosco, Remembering Paradise: Nativism and Nostalgia in Eighteenth-
Century Japan, Harvard University Press, 1990; Peter Flueckiger, Imagining Harmony: 
Poetry, Empathy, and Community in Mid-Tokugawa Confucianism and Nativism, 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011; Mark McNally, Proving the Way: Conflict and 
Practice in the History of Japanese Nativism, Harvard University Asia Center, 2005;  
Mark Teeuwen, ‘Kokugaku vs. Nativism’, Monumenta Nipponica, Vol. 61, No. 2, 2006, 
pp. 227–242; Susan L.Burns, Before the Nation: Kokugaku and the Imagining of 
Community in Early Modern Japan, Durham: Duke University Press, 2003; Michael 
Wachutka, Kokugaku in Meiji-Period Japan. The Modern Transformation of National 
Learning and the Formation of Scholarly Societies, Leiden, Boston: Global Oriental, 2012. 
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Edo-period kokugaku focused on Japanese classics, on exploring, 
studying and reviving (or even inventing) ancient Japanese language, 
literature, myths, history and also political ideology. As an academic 
discipline, it relied on philology as its methodological tool to bring out 
the ethos of Japanese tradition freed from foreign ideas and thoughts. 
They drew upon ancient Japanese poetry to show the “true emotion” of 
Japan, so “National learning” favoured philological research into the 
early Japanese classics. They tried to re-establish Japanese culture 
before the influx of foreign thought and behaviour, so they turned 
primarily to Shintō, the earliest poets in Japan (Man’yōshu), and the 
inventors of Japanese culture in the Heian court. 
The most important scholars included Keichū26 (1640–1701), who 
did philological study of Japanese classics and interpretative study of 
classical language and of Man’yōshū. Kada no Azumamaro27 (1669–
1736) is famous for his theological studies of ancient teachings and 
faiths: Shintō studies, and also for his studies on ancient court and 
military practices, and for an interpretative study of classics, too. Kamo 
no Mabuchi
28
 (1697–1769) pursued interpretative study of waka poetry 
and of classical language, of Man’yōshū and studied ancient morality as 
well (kōkokushugi).29 Motoori Norinaga30 (1730–1801) had philological 
studies and literary criticism of Genjimonogatari; also studied ancient 
morality centred on Kojiki; made research on Shintō and the ancient 
Japanese language. 
Over the course of the Edo period the aim of kokugaku studies 
shifted from the scholarly and philological study of ancient texts to the 
quest for a unique native ethos and spiritual identity, free of Buddhist 
and other foreign traits and identified more or less with Shintō. It 
displayed a discourse that aimed at restoring the classical world of 
ancient Japan. 
By the end of the 18
th
 century it had political and religious 
implications as well.
31
 Motoori Norinaga
32
 made linguistic claims about 
                                                          
26 Burns, Before the Nation…, pp. 49–52; Nosco, Remembering Paradise…, pp. 49–67. 
27 Nosco, Remembering Paradise…, pp. 71–97. 
28 Ibid., pp. 100–155. 
29 Flueckiger, Imagining Harmony…, p. 155. 
30  Byron H. Earhart, Japanese Religion: Unity and Diversity, Belmont, California: 
Wadsworth, 1982, pp. 144–147; Bary Wm. Theodore de, Tsunoda Ryusaku and Keene 
Donald (eds.), Sources of Japanese Tradition II, New York: Columbia University Press, 
2001, pp. 15–35. 
31 Flueckiger, Imagining Harmony…, p. 173. 
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the “difference” of ancient Japanese into the foundation of a theory of 
Japanese cultural identity, uniqueness and superiority. He defined the 
contours of a new theory of Japanese history, culture, and subject-ness,
33
 
seeing the emperor as occupying a special position in relation to the 
gods, language and rites. His work, Kojikiden transformed Japanese 
conceptions of their own history and culture and made the Kojiki 
a central work in the Japanese cultural canon. He initiated new strategies 
that determined the new kokugaku discourse that appeared in the 18
th
 
century, highlighted language as the primary “bearer of identity and 
difference”, focused on the “origin and nature of cultural difference”, 
and created new political vocabulary focused on the emperor. These 
strategies enabled a new vision of Japan.
34
 
Hirata Atsutane
35
 (1776–1843) studied Shintō mainly for political 
purposes, dealt with the doctrine of national character, and studied 
ancient history and morality also. He took his scholarship “original 
teaching” (honkyō – the term appeared in the preface to Kojiki in 712), 
the original tradition of Japanese antiquity, which was closely related to 
Shintō traditions in the Edo period. His school became connected to 
political aims and movements, too, with emphasizing “kannagara no 
michi”, “the Way as it is with the Kamis”, which meant the ancient way 
of the Japanese life “as it was in the Age of Gods”.36 Hirata’s teachings 
with the terms and ideas of “kannagara no michi” and “honkyō” were 
definitely different from the philological studies of the earlier kokugaku 
scholars, and offered ideological basis for political movements, too. 
Actually, the kokugaku scholars “made” Shintō by distinguishing the 
cult of kami “as a separate, autonomous entity existing apart from 
another distinct entity called Buddhism”.37 Hirata was also important as 
                                                                                                                     
32  See several chapters in Burns, Before the Nation…, especially pp. 68–101; Nosco, 
Remembering Paradise…, pp. 160–203. 
33 Helen Hardacre: ‘Creating State Shintō: The Great Promulgation Campaign and the 
New Religions’, Journal of Japanese Studies, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1986, pp. 29–63, 36. See 
also: Burns, Before the Nation…, pp. 220–223. 
34 Burns, Before the Nation…, pp. 220–223. 
35 Harootunian, Things Seen and Unseen…, pp. 199–204. 
36 Michael Wachutka, Restorative and Innovative Elements in Early Meiji Religious and 
Educational Politic: http://www.desk.c.u-tokyo.ac.jp/download/es_9_Wachutka.pdf 
(accessed 26.05.2016), pp. 189–190. 
37 Hardacre: ‘Creating State Shintō…’, p. 32. 
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a systematiser and propagandist, too, and through him and his disciples 
the ideas of kokugaku became widespread in the early 19
th
 century.
38
 
The findings of kokugakus cholars inspired a popular movement for 
the restoration of a Japanese “golden age”, paved the way for the return 
of imperial rule, as politically called for the overthrow of the shōgunate 
and restoration for direct rule by the divinely-descended emperor. The 
thoughts of kokugaku influenced the Sonnōjōi 39  philosophy and 
movement: the slogan sonnō (revere the emperor) typified the new 
emphasis on the emperor and the term kokutai
40 (“national unity”) 
expressed the new concept of the state. So, the political implications of 
the kokugaku doctrine were the establishment of a strong centralized 
monarchy toward which every Japanese owed absolute allegiance and 
the destruction of the shōgunate or any other power which stood 
between sovereign and people.
41
 Among others, it led to the eventual 
collapse of the Tokugawa in 1868 and the subsequent Meiji restoration, 
and the building of a strong nation state. 
What Meiji scholars employed as traditions were actually revivals of 
the kokugaku tenets, which were not entirely inventions, as they 
contained elements of old cultural heritage. The Meiji eliteused 
kokugaku conceptions of Japan to construct a modern nationalism that 
was not simply derived from Western models and was not purely 
instrumental, but made good use of premodern and culturalist 
conceptions of community.
42
 Kokugaku thinking influenced Meiji 
government policies in relation to Shintō, state Shintō and the ideology 
of kokutai.
43
 
                                                          
38  Helen Hardacre: Shintō and the State, 1868–1988, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1989, p. 17. 
39 The term first appeared in Aizawa Seishisai’s work: Shinron, in 1825. W. G. Beasley, 
The Modern History of Japan, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1985, pp. 50–53, Bob 
Tadashi Wakabayashi, Anti-Foreignism and Western Learning in Early-Modern Japan: 
The New Theses of 1825, Harvard East Asian Monographs 126, Harvard University Press, 
1999, pp. 100–135. 
40 Marius B. Jansen, ‘Meiji Ishin: The Political Context’ in Meiji Ishin: Restoration and 
Revolution, Nagai Michio and Miguel Urrutia (eds.), Tokyo: United Nations University, 
1985, pp. 5–6; Wakabayashi, Anti-Foreignism and Western Learning…, pp. 123–135. 
41 Bellah, Tokugawa Religion…, p. 102. 
42 Burgess, ‘The Illusion…’. For the thesis that modern Asian varieties of nationalism were 
not simply borrowed from the West but made good use of premodern and culturalist 
concepts see: Prasenjit Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1996. 
43 Hardacre, Shintō and the State…, pp. 42–58. 
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Meiji restoration: modernization with tradition 
Let us see now just one example of this “modernization with 
tradition” in the process of the founding of the modern state. The later 
kokugaku writers played an important role in Bakumatsu and early Meiji 
religious life, exerting a powerful influence upon Shintō priesthood and 
upon the formation of government policy. Although early kokugaku was 
not inherently Shintō, by Bakumatsu it had become so.44 The Mitogaku45 
(the Edo-period centre for Confucian scholarship) also dealt with the 
history of ancient Japan, and by the time of the early 19
th 
they got 
connected to kokugaku thinkers and theories, developed their ideas 
centred around the emperor, and thus greatly contributed to the 
formation of the sonnōjōi (“rever the emperor, expel the barbarians”) 
slogan and movement, and the concept of kokutai as well. The writings 
and teachings of the most important kokugaku scholars – Motoori 
Norinaga, Hirata Atsutane, and the significant Mitogaku scholar, Aizawa 
Seishisai – became known in wide circles in the country.46 The copies of 
their works circulated in the cities and in the countryside as well, among 
samurais, city dwellers and local elites in the countryside, too; it can be 
assumed that these works were read by “all the men who carried out the 
Meiji Revolution in 1868”. 47  The Hirata’s disciples came from all 
backgrounds, shrine priests, merchants, and wealthy peasants alike, and 
his books were sold in their thousands.
48
 
Kokugaku scholars had direct personal ties to the Restoration leaders. 
Iwakura Tomomi (one of the most powerful courtiers and politicians of 
the early Meiji government) had a group of advisors consisted mainly of 
leading kokugaku scholars (Hirata Kanetane, Yano Harumichi, Gonda 
Naosuke, Iida Takesato).
49
 He was also connected to Ōkuni Takamasa 
                                                          
44 Hardacre, ‘Creating State Shintō…’, p. 35. 
45 Mito school: Herschel Webb, ‘The Development of an Orthodox Attitude Toward the 
Imperial Constitution in the Nineteenth Century’ in Changing Japanese Attitudes Toward 
Modernization, Marius B. Jansen (ed.), Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965, pp. 
167–192;  Beasley, The Modern History of Japan…, pp. 50–53; Jansen, ‘Meiji Ishin…’, 
pp. 3–20; Wakabayashi, Anti-Foreignism and Western Learning…, pp. 51–58. 
46 Burns, Before the Nation…, p. 69; John Breen and Mark Teeuwen, A New History of 
Shinto, New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, p. 64. 
47 Burns, Before the Nation…, p. 69;  Breen and Teeuwen, A New History of Shinto…, p. 
64. 
48 Ibidem. 
49 Wachutka, Kokugaku in Meiji-Period…, p. 13. 
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and his disciple, Tamamatsu Misao, who elaborated the idea of the 
legacy of Emperor Jimmu (though this theory was also supported by 
Yano Harumichi, too).
50
 Iwakura strongly supported the scheme of 
receiving the legacy of emperor Jimmu against other “competing 
narratives” (like Godaigo’s Kemmu restoration), which clearly shows the 
effect of his kokugaku background and education. 
Several kokugakusha later became officials holding ministerial posts 
in the new Meiji government.
51
 Ōkuni Takamasa (himself an admirer of 
Motoori Norinaga and disciple of Hirata Atsutane, at the same time 
closely related to Aizawa Seishisai) and his disciple Fukuba Bisei were 
the most influential kokugaku scholars regarding the construction of the 
Meiji restoration.
52
 They contributed to the construction of 
an ideological system about the emperor’s descent from the Sun-
goddess, which was to legitimize the imperial restoration, basing it on 
Jimmu tennō’s ancient establishment of the Japanese empire.53 
In December, 1867, a group of young samurai activists had an 
imperial rescript issued in the court announcing the abolishment of the 
shōgunate and calling for a “restoration of direct imperial rule” as it was 
established in the time of the ancient emperor Jimmu.
54
 In January 1868, 
Satsuma and Chōshu samurais with young court nobles established 
a new imperial government, which meant that all the people of Japan got 
under direct imperial rule, governed by imperial decrees.
55
 The first 
pronouncement issued by the new Meiji government – the Grand Order 
on the Restoration of Imperial Rule – stated explicitly, with regard to the 
basis of the restoration that “everything is based on Jimmu’s 
establishment”, which was clearly a result of the strong kokugaku 
influence on early Meiji politics.
56
 The ideology of the imperial myth 
aimed at legitimizing the imperial rule and the new regime (and also the 
coup that brought it into being) originated from the writings and theories 
on Shintō and the interpretation of ancient Japanese history and myths of 
Motoori Norinaga and Aizawa Seishisai. It had a simple but convincing 
narrative about the Sun-goddess’ establishing the imperial house in 
                                                          
50 Ibid., p. 11.  
51 Ibid., p. 9. 
52 Breenand and Teeuwen, A New History of Shinto…, p. 64. 
53 Wachutka, Kokugaku in Meiji-Period…, p. 13. 
54 Breen and Teeuwen, A New History of Shinto…, p. 21. 
55 Ibid., p. 109. 
56 Wachutka, Kokugaku in Meiji-Period…, p. 11. 
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mythical time, sending her grandson, Ninigi to earth to rule Japan, 
whose descendant, Jimmu became the first emperor of Japan. It implied 
of course that the emperors of the unbroken line of the Japanese imperial 
family were direct descendants of the Sun-goddess Amaterasu.
57
 The 
basic principle was that the unbroken line of the divine imperial family 
preserved the unity of the Japanese state and religion during history.
58
 
The term “Fukko Shintō” – first used officially in April 1868 in 
a document of the Office of Divinity, stating that “the religion of our 
Imperial country is to be declared as Fukko Shintō” – appeared as the 
spiritual basement of this concept.
59
 It seemed the revival of an ancient 
Japanese belief-system, though it was mainly based on the ideology and 
tenets of the Hirata school of kokugaku.
60
 Ōkuni Takamasa and Fukuba 
Bisei, the main proponents of modern Shintō, were also influenced by 
Aizawa Seishisai’s view on imperial ritual, which included the notion of 
the shrines as the sites for state rites.
61
 As a consequence of this theory, 
shrines were freed from the control of the so far leading Shintō priest 
families and were placed under state authority. The edicts of 1868 
(written mainly by Ōkuni Takamasa and Fukuba Bisei) ordered all 
shrine priests under the authority of the newly resurrected ancient 
institution, the Jingikan,
62
 which was to be in nominal charge of all 
shrines.
63
 Also shrines were separated from Buddhism, and all Buddhist 
influence was expelled from the shrines. Shintō and Buddhism was 
separated.
64
 The new Shintō emphasized the role and significance of the 
emperor as the sole focus of national unity, and shrines were seen as 
places partly to propagate this function and partly to worship the 
emperor. Actually, shrines functioned as a form of ancestor worship, and 
“by honouring the ancestors of the nation, a community was created that 
celebrated a shared past”.65 The shrines became important symbols of 
the divine ascendance of the emperors, the unique cultural heritage of 
Japan as the “Land of the Gods”, and that the imperial system was 
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legitimized by the kamis.
66
 The centre of this new shrine system was Ise, 
the shrine of the imperial ancestor and Sun-goddess Amaterasu. New 
cult centres linked to Ise were built around the country, performing 
worship on the newly appointed festivals of Emperor Jimmu.
67
 
It is generally acknowledged that the kokugaku scholars played 
an important role in the formation of the Japanese state and in the 
concept of a national identity in the early Meiji period. Nonetheless, 
their significance seemed to fade or even disappear after the first years 
of the Restoration, as in the 1870s the process of “Westernization” 
became more and more emphasized in not just economic, but also social, 
political, educational and even cultural aspects. It may seem that at the 
Restoration, the new Meiji leadership merely used figures such as Hirata 
Kanetane, together with his popular Fukko Shintō, to legitimize the 
creation of an imperial ideology supporting their programme of 
institutional change for the new nation-state, and this idea seems to be 
supported by the fact that a lot of kokugaku scholars were involved in 
the central government for only a few years.
68
 However, their 
importance can be seen not only in the first measures, as their 
conception of the imperial system as a unity of worship and rule, saisei-
itchi, remained the framework of the imperial state until 1945. The new 
regime of the Meiji state was based on the principle that “rites and 
government are one”, that the Emperor, as a Shintō high priest, performs 
state rituals (sai) while simultaneously overseeing the government (sei) 
as a political sovereign so the imperial office is thus defined by the unity 
(itchi) of these two functions – as it used to be in the ancient times, 
during the Ritsuryō system, which was seen as an ideal form of the 
imperial rule in Japan.
69
 The restoration of direct imperial rule, ritual 
and politics, which had long been separated under the feudal shōgunal 
system, united again these two functions in one figure: the Emperor. 
This characteristic feature of the modern Emperor-system state: 
“…Was its creation and gradual formation as a ‘state that unites 
ritual and politics’, rarely met in other nation-states? Its consolidation as 
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well as its creation and formation cannot be told without acknowledging 
the national-learning scholars”.70 
 
Reconstructed tradition in Meiji Japan 
The aim of this paper was to look at the “reconstruction of tradition” 
at the time of the Restoration, but it is indispensable to look, even very 
briefly, further into the later developments regarding kokugaku of the 
Meiji period. The topic of Shintō, state Shintō and its “creation” is 
closely related to the idea of “reconstructing tradition”, but even the 
brief overview of this process would far exceed the limits of this paper 
(even without mentioning the ongoing, sometimes sharp debates about 
it)”.71 Thus, we can have a look at the works of Meiji period kokugaku 
scholars and their perception of that time. In his excellent book Michael 
Wachutka examines and analyses Meiji period kokugaku, demonstrates 
the importance of kokugaku influence in the Meiji Restoration, in 
“creating” Shintō, in forming the ideology of the new state.72 He also 
proves that the dichotomy existing between kokugaku and modernity 
must be considered incorrect.
73
 Kokugaku did not “disappear” in Meiji 
Japan; rather, it counterbalanced the excessive drive towards the 
Westernization of society, ideology and political life in the process of 
nation-building and the formation of a new modern identity. The early 
years of Meiji saw the rapid and abundant importation of Western 
cultures into Japan, which, in fact, stimulated the people to reflect and 
reconsider their own national culture and the revival of the kokugaku 
movements.
74
 From the 1880s onward, there was a growing tendency to 
                                                          
70 Ibidem. Here he cites Sakamoto Koremaru, Kokka Shintōtaisei no seiritsu to tenkai, 
Tokyo: Kobunda, 1993, p. iii. 
71  Hardacre, Shintō and the State…; Sakamoto, Kokka Shintō…; some of the newest 
works: Breen and Teeuwen, A New History of Shinto…; Trent E. Maxey, The “Greatest 
Problem”: Religion and State Formation in Meiji Japan, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Asia Center, 2014; Jun'ichi Isomae, Religious Discourse in Modern Japan: 
Religion, State, and Shintō, Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2014; Jun’ichi Isomae, Japanese 
Mytholohgy. Hermeneutics on Scripture, London: Equinox, 2010; Jason Ānanda 
Josephson, The Invention of Religion in Japan, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2012;  John Breen and Mark Teeuwen (eds.), Shinto in History: Ways of the Kami, New 
York: Routledge, 2000.  
72 Wachutka, Kokugaku in Meiji-Period…, pp. 9–13. 
73 Ibid., p. XI. 
74 Uchino Goro, ‘Early Modern Kokugaku (National Learning) and the New Kokugaku: 
Their Growth and Significance’ in Cultural Identity and Modernization in Asian 
Countries: Proceedings of Kokugakuin University Centennial Symposium, Institute for 
Reconstructing Tradition...  45 
 
“rediscover” and/or “preserve” Japanese tradition and values. The most 
important documents reflecting the “ideology” or it may be better to say, 
the identity of Meiji Japan around 1890 all show a distinctive Japanese 
character, going back to Mito Confucianism and the kokugaku ancestral 
tradition of the unbroken and divine imperial line. The Constitution 
(1889), the Imperial Rescript of Education (1890), the Elementary 
School ordinance (1889), and the Imperial Household Law (1889) were 
all partly drafted by Inoue Kowashi, a prominent Meiji statesman with 
strong kokugaku educational background, who combined Confucian and 
kokugaku traditions, saying that “the national classics are the father, 
Confucianism is the teacher” for the nation, and thus both were essential 
to the governance of the nation. The initial phase of the Rescript of 
Education contained the phrase “our imperial ancestors from Amaterasu 
and Jimmu through the unbroken line of historical emperors”, the 
Rescript promulgating the Constitution and the Imperial Household Law 
made the same reference.
75
 The Rescript on Education placed the 
imperial ancestors into the centre of attention again. Inoue Kowashi 
called the Shintō rites as “the foundation of the nation” and the “source 
of custom”.76 The main function of the tradition of the kokugaku still 
living in late Meiji, too, was to counterbalance the excessive drive 
towards the Westernization of society, ideology and political life in the 
process of nation-building and the formation of a new modern identity. 
Several other kokugaku scholars of the Meiji period (Konakamura 
Kiyonori, Iida Takesato, Kimura Masakoto, Kurokawa Mayori
77
) 
transformed kokugaku from a politico-religious movement to 
an academic discipline focused on Japanese matters. They played 
important roles in higher education, in the founding of Japanese studies 
and research in Japanese history, literature, grammar, language reforms, 
philosophy, and ethnography. 
 
Conclusion 
The special process of “reconstructing tradition”, with the role of 
early modern kokugaku in this development, may be one of the crucial 
                                                                                                                     
Japanese Culture and Classics, Kokugakuin University, 1983: 
http://www2.kokugakuin.ac.jp/ijcc/wp/cimac/uchino.html (accessed 12.06.2012). 
75 Carol Gluck, Japan’s Modern Myths. Ideology in the Late Meiji Period, Princeton: 
Princeton Unicersity Press, 1985, pp. 123 and 139. 
76 Ibid., p. 139. 
77 Wachutka, Kokugaku in Meiji-Period…, p. 10. 
46 Mária Ildikó Farkas 
 
factors explaining the distinct characteristics of Japanese modernity 
originating from the Japanese cultural traditions and historical 
experience and distinguishing it from the Western and also from other 
non-Western entities confronted with the Western program of rapid 
modernization. Though the conception of the national community was 
greatly influenced by Western notions of nationalism, it was formulated 
in the ideology of the Meiji period in ways different from those of the 
Western nation-states.
78
 As described in this paper, Japanese 
intellectuals drawing on early modern scholarly research known 
as kokugaku played an important role into designing Japan as a modern 
nation-state mainly according to the slogan wakonyōsai, which referred 
to the juxtaposition of Japanese “roots” (that is, its spirituality, its values 
and its beliefs) and Western technology and knowledge. The Japanese 
nation was defined as a unique type of collectivity in primordial sacral-
natural terms building on the basic conceptions of the kokutai as 
developed by the nativistic schools of the Tokugawa period, which is a 
distinctive mode of “reconstruction of tradition”. 79  The Meiji elites 
claimed to restore an ancient imperial system, however, in fact they 
combined the different components of the emperor symbols developed 
in Japanese history from the ancient role of the emperor in a new way.
80
 
The centration around the emperor and its symbolical connection with 
the Shintō version of the creation of Japan appears as an important link 
between the abstract world of the kokugaku as practiced in the Edo 
period and further historical developments (including such as the kokka-
shintō, the expansionist war politics, as well as the astonishing post-war 
recovery). This Meiji-period Japanese pattern of economic, political, and 
cultural modernity was the result of a distinct cultural program closely 
related to some of the basic features of the Japanese historical 
experience, which – similarly to various Eastern European and Asian 
societies – developed as a continual response to the threatening military, 
economic, and technological superiority of the West, with its cultural 
and ideological program.
81
 With “reconstructing tradition”, Japan could 
accomplish modernization while seemingly preserving its traditions, 
thus could solve the dilemma of almost every non-Western country: 
changing its cultural horizon without losing its identity.  
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